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Abstract
How does parliamentary organization affect the legislative success rate of the executive in presidential and 
parliamentary systems at the subnational level? Why are some governors much more successful than others 
even though they serve under the same basic constitutional designs? This essay explores these questions with 
a comparison of Brazilian and German states from 1990 to 2010. Our main findings are that governors’ success 
rates in both Brazil and Germany seem not to be associated with centralization of legislative institutions. This 
means that coalition management and party politics may play a larger role than expected by the literature. 
Other factors, such as “minor” and neglected legislative arrangements can compound the governors’ strength 
and allow them to reach Westminster levels of legislative success. 
I How does parliamentary organization affect the 
legislative success rate of the executive in presiden-
tial and parliamentary systems at the subnational 
level? Why are some governors much more success-
ful than others even though they serve under the 
same basic constitutional designs? Furthermore, 
why are some governors much more successful than 
the literature expects? This article explores these 
three questions with a comparison of Brazilian and 
German states from 1990 to 2010. 
We argue that legislative organization plays a central 
role in explaining why some Brazilian and German 
governors are much more successful in the approval 
of their bills than others. There is a burgeoning lite-
rature on this matter in both presidential systems 
(Figueiredo and Limongi 2000) and parliamentary 
democracies (Doring and Hallerberg 2004). We con-
tribute to this literature in at least two ways. 
The first is a novel comparison between multiparty 
systems with very different “basic institutions” – 
i. e., systems of government and electoral systems.1 
We believe that the fact Brazil and Germany both 
have considerable legislative fragmentation and di-
versity in party ideology makes a comparison betwe-
en these countries very promising. 
Our second possible contribution is in the unpacking 
of the “minor” legislative rules that may have consi-
derable, though indirect, impact on policy. Though 
much has been written about negative agenda po-
wer (Cameron 2000), positive agenda power (Carey 
and Shugart 1998) and how they interact (Cox 2000, 
2006), attention is still lacking as to the effects of 
seemingly “minor” institutions.
The literature expects constitutional design, party 
politics and legislative organization to explain the 
success rate of the executive. Our case studies allow 
us to hold the first set of variables constant when 
we compare Brazilian states to Brazilian states. The 
second set of variables – related to party politics – 
are held constant when we compare some Brazilian 
states to some German states. And finally, the “le-
gislative organization” variable is conceptualized 
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considering which actors hold negative and positive 
agenda power and is held constant when comparing 
some Brazilian states to some German states. 
We dialogue with three strands of the literature in 
political science. The first strand is comprised of 
many authors that attempt to explain executive suc-
cess through classic constitutional variables such as 
the existence of a vote of confidence procedure, the 
existence of presidential agenda power entrenched 
in the Constitution and the importance of electoral 
system incentives (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; 
many others). The second strand also focuses on 
constitutional institutions, but with a clear incorpo-
ration of coalition government and party politics as 
the main explanatory variable for executive success 
(Strom et al. 2010; Saiegh 2009; many others). Fi-
nally, the third strand in the literature incorporates 
matters of legislative organization, something whi-
ch is particularly innovative for presidential syste-
ms (Strom 1998; Cox 2000; Figueiredo and Limongi 
2000; Döring 2001; many others). 
Before getting into the theoretical discussion, we 
note that our main puzzle - Why are most governors 
of Brazilian and German states more successful in 
the legislature than the literature expects? - must 
be illustrated with data about legislative success. 
Table 1 presents this for Brazilian governors and Ta-
ble 2 does the same for German governors. 
Table 1. Government Success Rates in the Brazilian States, 1987 to 2008
State Period
Executive  
Success Rate (%)
Higher success than 
Saiegh baseline?
Higher success than 
federal level baseline?
Acre 2007-2008 66.2 No No 
Alagoas 2003-2006 91.7 Yes Yes 
Amazonas 1995-1998 100.0 Yes Yes 
1999-2002 98.0 Yes Yes
2003-2006 100.0 Yes Yes
2007-2008 100.0 Yes Yes
Amapá 1991-1994 86.4 Yes Yes
1995-1998 89.7 Yes Yes
1999-2002 93.8 Yes Yes
2003-2006 91.9 Yes Yes
2007-2008 100.0 Yes Yes
Ceará 1995-1998 93.7 Yes Yes
1999-2002 92.9 Yes Yes
2003-2006 95.0 Yes Yes
2007-2008 97.1 Yes Yes
Espírito Santo 1987-1990 84.9 Yes Yes
1991-1994 83.9 Yes Yes
1995-1998 85.5 Yes Yes
1999-2002 85.4 Yes Yes
2003-2006 92.5 Yes Yes
2007-2008 97.0 Yes Yes
Maranhão 1999-2002 97.2 Yes Yes
2003-2006 68.7 No No 
2007-2008 83.3 Yes Yes
Minas Gerais 1987-1990 80.8 Yes Yes
1991-1994 84.1 Yes Yes
1995-1998 86.2 Yes Yes
1999-2002 67.4 No No 
2003-2006 74.1 Yes No 
2007-2008 88.4 Yes Yes
Pará 2007-2008 74.8 Yes No 
Paraíba 2003-2006 91.0 Yes Yes
2007-2008 81.2 Yes Yes
Pernambuco 1999-2002 91.8 Yes Yes
2003-2006 95.3 Yes Yes
2007-2008 98.0 Yes Yes
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State Period
Executive  
Success Rate (%)
Higher success than 
Saiegh baseline?
Higher success than 
federal level baseline?
Paraná 1995-1998 92.9 Yes Yes
1999-2002 81.1 Yes Yes
2003-2006 91.4 Yes Yes
2007-2008 86.9 Yes Yes
Rio de Janeiro 1995-1998 90.9 Yes Yes
1999-2002 78.0 Yes Yes
2003-2006 82.7 Yes Yes
Rio Grande do Sul 1991-1994 76.9 Yes Yes
1995-1998 91.5 Yes Yes
1999-2002 78.3 Yes Yes
2003-2006 91.0 Yes Yes
2007-2008 92.1 Yes Yes
Santa Catarina 1995-1998 90.1 Yes Yes
1999-2002 91.9 Yes Yes
2003-2006 93.6 Yes Yes
2007-2008 92.2 Yes Yes
Sergipe 1999-2002 84.7 Yes Yes
2003-2006 92.6 Yes Yes
2007-2008 79.2 Yes Yes
São Paulo 1987-1990 76.5 Yes No 
1991-1994 60.7 No No 
1995-1998 90.4 Yes Yes
1999-2002 75.3 Yes No 
2003-2006 79.6 Yes Yes
2007-2008 99.1 Yes Yes
Total 84.4 Yes Yes
Source: Tomio and Ricci (2010); the Saiegh (2009) baseline is 66%; Federal level baseline is 75%.
Table 2. Government Success Rates in the German States, 1990 to 2011
State Period
Executive  
Success Rate(%)
Higher success than 
Saiegh baseline?
Higher success  
than federal  
level baseline?
Bayern 1994-1998 100.00 Yes Yes
 1998-2003 99.12 Yes Yes
 2003-2008 100.00 Yes Yes
Brandenburg 1994-1999 99.30 Yes Yes
 1999-2004 98.54 Yes Yes
 2004-2009 100.00 Yes Yes
Hamburg 1997-2001 97.20 Yes Yes
 2001-2004 97.06 Yes Yes
 2004-2008 100.00 Yes Yes
 2008-2011 96.40 Yes Yes
Hessen 1995-1999 96.63 Yes Yes
 1999-2003 98.96 Yes Yes
 2003-2008 100.00 Yes Yes
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1990-1994 95.32 Yes Yes
1994-1998 95.91 Yes Yes
 1998-2002 97.18 Yes Yes
 2002-2006 98.88 Yes Yes
Niedersachsen 1994-1998 98.25 Yes Yes
 1998-2003 97.83 Yes Yes
 2003-2008 97.81 Yes Yes
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State Period
Executive  
Success Rate(%)
Higher success than 
Saiegh baseline?
Higher success  
than federal  
level baseline?
Nordrhein-Westfalen 1995-2000 100.00 Yes Yes
 2000-2005 100.00 Yes Yes
 2005-2010 99.47 Yes Yes
Rheinland-Pfalz 1991-1996 99.12 Yes Yes
 1996-2001 100.00 Yes Yes
 2001-2006 100.00 Yes Yes
Saarland 1994-1999 86.84 Yes Yes
 1999-2004 100.00 Yes Yes
 2004-2009 99.12 Yes Yes
Sachsen 1990-1994 98.25 Yes Yes
 1994-1999 98.51 Yes Yes
 1999-2004 95.65 Yes Yes
 2004-2009 93.07 Yes Yes
Sachsen-Anhalt 1994-1998 92.39 Yes Yes
 1998-2002 97.26 Yes Yes
 2002-2006 99.15 Yes Yes
Schleswig-Holstein 1992-1996 100.00 Yes Yes
 1996-2000 97.22 Yes Yes
 2000-2005 93.75 Yes Yes
Thüringen 1990-1994 96.60 Yes Yes
 1994-1999 97.52 Yes Yes
 1999-2004 94.44 Yes Yes
 2004-2009 97.30 Yes Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations based on statistics provided by the Landtag administrations for each legislative period;          
the Saiegh (2009) baseline is 66%; Federal level baseline is 75%.
The rest of the article is divided into five sections. 
The first introduces the three main models in legis-
lative studies that guide our theoretical approach 
and on which we base our legislative centralization 
index. The second section presents the two main pu-
zzles regarding legislative organization and execu-
tive success rates in Brazil and Germany. The third 
section explains our legislative centralization index 
and the fourth presents our results for Germany and 
Brazil. Section five concludes. 
(I) Three schools of legislative studies
Legislatures are complex political institutions that 
constitute an arena where members compete for 
valuable resources, which are legislative time, ins-
titutional positions, staff and funding and foremost 
legislative outcomes (McCubbins 2005). In order to 
explain the underlying organizational structures 
and processes leading to the outcomes, three di-
fferent models have come to dominate the field of 
comparative legislative studies, which are the ‘Pivo-
tal Politics Model’ ,’Conditional Party Government 
Model’, and ‘Procedural Cartel Theory’. The main 
dividing line between them lies in the acceptan-
ce or denial of party dominance in the parliament, 
affecting the behavior of its members and thereby 
the legislative outcomes. While party dominance 
and discipline are widely taken for granted in West-
minster-style legislatures like the British House of 
Commons (Cox 1987), they have been contested in 
the case of the U.S. Congress and Brazilian state 
legislatures. In the following we will briefly discuss 
the three influential models and their guiding the-
oretical assumptions, as well as their viability with 
regard to our Brazilian and German cases.
The ‘Pivotal Politics Model’ is mainly based on the 
work of Krehbiel (1993, 1995, 1998) and is closely 
linked to the informational approach (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1987; 1989; 1990). It clearly states that le-
gislative outcomes are based on the preferences of 
independent and fully strategic legislators and not 
on ‘party influence’. The main rationale behind it is 
that legislative institutions and outcomes are adop-
ted by majority rule, following a bargaining process 
between the individual legislators. But they reflect 
the preferences of the majority (i.e., the median le-
gislator) and not of party-based coalitions.2 This im-
plies ‘weak parties’ in legislative politics, but also in 
electoral politics vis-à-vis the legislators and their 
interest in reelection.
Does the model provide an accurate understan-
ding of the state assemblies under investigation? 
This is hardly the case for the Landtage, since the 
German parties largely control the access of candi-
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dates to the ballot in the mixed election systems. 
To ignore the party preferences and ‘voting disci-
pline’ (Fraktionsdisziplin) presents a serious threat 
to the reelection of a candidate, which is not the 
case in the U.S. Correspondingly, reelection in Ger-
many is foremost a function of the partisan voting 
of the electorate (Eder and Magin 2008; Masicotte 
2010). Likewise in Brazil, party bosses have formal 
and informal control over the electoral success of 
backbenchers (Braga and Praça 2007), despite as-
sertions to the contrary by Mainwaring (1991) and 
Carey and Shugart (1995, p. 428). 
Parallel to the informational model, other mo-
dels have been developed that can be labeled as 
‘partisan theories’ (Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011a), 
since they acknowledge party affiliation as main 
explaining variable of legislative outcomes. They 
can be distinguished by their understanding of 
parties as ‘floor voting coalitions’ or as ‘procedural 
coalitions’. The floor-voting approach to parties 
assumes that legislative coalitions provide collec-
tive benefits that may conflict with individuals’ in-
terests, so that a collective action problem arises. 
In the ‘Conditional Party Government Model’ (Rho-
de 1991), party leaders can provide incentives to 
party members to overcome their opposition or to 
change their vote on policy issues. They can inter 
alia offer career opportunities, such as appoint-
ments to attractive party positions, committees or 
ministries, or use ‘sticks’ like the loss of institutio-
nal positions, or even denial of access to the ballot. 
The strength of this party government depends on 
party unity (often referred to as ‘homogeneity’) 
on the major legislative agenda and on the pola-
rization between the party in government and the 
opposition. While the capacity to exert effective 
party pressure is completely rejected by the ‘Pivo-
tal Politics Model’, the key issue of criticism on this 
partisan approach in the broader congressional 
studies debate is the problem of distinguishing the 
effects of members’ interest and party affiliation 
(McCarty et al. 2001, Snyder and Groseclose 2000).
The model seems to be highly appropriate to frame 
the debate of German scholars on voting discipline 
versus free mandate (Arndt 1989) in a way to facili-
tate a broader, comparative and theoretically guided 
discussion (Saalfeld 2005). Indeed, parties provide 
the only channel for a political career in the Länder 
and the voting behavior can be sanctioned or rewar-
ded through positive and negative conditionality. 
Besides party pressure, the system of parliamenta-
ry democracy enforces voting discipline, since the 
head of government can dissolve the parliament and 
impose a vote of confidence. Such constitutional ru-
les increase the costs of deflecting voting behavior 
for backbenchers. Nevertheless, conflicts between 
the government, party leaders and backbenchers 
can occur due a lack of homogeneity in the gover-
ning party or the governing party coalition, a strong 
committee orientation of legislators as members of 
a highly specialized working parliament (Arbeitspar-
lament), or because of a lack of interest in a parlia-
mentary career (Saalfeld 2005, 30f). In Brazil, the 
idea of parties as “floor voting coalitions” instead 
of agenda setters in earlier stages of the legislative 
process has been convincingly put to rest, at least 
at the national level, by Amorim Neto et al. (2003). 
The second ‘partisan approach’ defines parties as 
‘procedural coalitions’. The central issue is the abi-
lity of the governing party to control the legislative 
agenda, i.e., the set of bills considered and voted 
on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005, p. 19). Ins-
tead of exerting pressure on its members, the party 
leaders take control of procedures and influence the 
agenda. The aforementioned theoretical and em-
pirical problem of identifying party influence and 
its effects is reframed in terms of an agenda con-
trol problem. Even though Krehbiel (1995) tries to 
provide empirical evidence against party influence 
on legislative institutions in the context of the U.S. 
Congress, there is evidence that the majority party 
uses restrictive rules in partisan affairs, disadvan-
taging the minority (Cox 2000; McCubbins 2005).
The ‘Procedural Cartel Theory’ of Cox and McCubbins 
(2005) bridges the gap between ‘partisan theories’ 
and the ‘Pivotal Politics Model’, since it combines 
the behavioral premise of unconstrained legislators 
that do not agree on issues along party lines, with 
parties exerting control on issues to be voted on. In 
this context, the governing parties form a ‘cartel’ by 
using the rule-making power of the assembly to bias 
the legislative process in their favor. Such a ‘cartel’ 
can emerge since the party leaders can provide a 
persuasive collective good to party members and 
backbenchers, which is the party’s reputation with 
the electorate. Since open conflict is often seen as 
‘admission of failure’ (Cowley 2002, p. 179), it is im-
portant for the parties to keep controversial and di-
viding issues off the floor. Control of the legislative 
procedures by positive and negative agenda-setting 
power provides party leaders with the ability to 
exert subtle strategic influence on the legislative 
process in order to reach preferred outcomes. This 
rationale is easily extended to the Brazilian case. 
Controversial issues can harm the multiparty-coali-
tions in the Länder severely, as they did at the natio-
nal level, once they reach the floor (Meng 2002), es-
pecially since some of the coalitions are considered 
to be more heterogeneous. This makes an investiga-
tion of the procedural cartel in Brazil and German 
states even more pertinent. 
(II) Presenting the puzzles
Puzzle 1: Why are the executive success 
rates in the Länder as high as one would 
expect them to be in a Westminster-style 
parliamentary system?
Any judgment of how successful the executive is de-
pends on how successful one expects it to be. These 
expectations depend on several factors. Based on 
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the models presented, the literature (Saiegh 2009; 
Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011b) identifies variables 
that take into consideration the conditions under 
which the executive is operating. The most impor-
tant ones are the (constant) availability of legisla-
tive majorities, the influence and the coherence of 
the party government of the ruling coalition in the 
legislature, and the control over the agenda by the 
executive and the majority.
The highest scores of executive success are expec-
ted to occur in Westminster-style parliamentary 
systems. This special form of parliamentary system 
features the main characteristics of a concentrated 
executive power within a strong one-party, majori-
tarian government and of clear dominance that the 
executive exercises in unity with the governing party 
over the legislature and the legislative process, inter 
alia facilitated by the far-reaching agenda-setting 
power it holds in the standing orders (Döring 1991). 
Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising 
to find that prime ministers and their cabinets are 
able to obtain passage of almost all of their pieces 
of legislation under such conditions. Saiegh (2009) 
provides evidence for executive success rates in 
Westminster-style legislators from 90 to 96 percent 
and thereby confirms the theoretical expectations. 
However, our data indicate similarly high success-
-rates for the Länder, even though the executive 
operates under different and arguably less favo-
rable condition in the context of the subnational 
parliamentary systems in Germany. One would ins-
tead expect the executive success rate to be about 
85 percent (Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011b), as at the 
national level, since the constitutional and legisla-
tive institutions at the subnational level are closer 
to those on the German federal level than to those 
of a Westminster-style system. The results are sur-
prising, since the governments in German Länder 
are usually based on more or less heterogeneous 
multiparty coalitions, which are theoretically and 
empirically assumed to lead to lower governmental 
success (Cheibub et al. 2004; Saiegh 2009). 
Comparing the success of executives in the German 
states to the empirical findings of success rates in 
14 different parliamentary systems (Saiegh 2009), 
we find the scores of the Länder to be significantly 
above the average of 83 percent. How can these 
exceptional success rates, reaching the level of a 
Westminster-style system, be explained? What are 
the mechanisms accounting for the variance of the 
success rates in the German cases?
Puzzle 2: Why are the executive success 
rates in some Brazilian states as high 
as one would expect them to be in a 
Westminster-style parliamentary system?
The second puzzle studied in this paper regards the 
legislative success rate of Brazilian governors. Some 
of them are as successful in passing their bills throu-
gh the legislature as prime ministers in Westmins-
ter-style systems. How can this be so, if governors 
in Brazil have to work with legislatures comprised 
of many different political parties which are ideolo-
gically diverse and if governors, unlike their coun-
terpart at the national level, cannot issue decrees3 
(Abrucio 1998; Santos 2001; Pereira 2001)? 
Much of the literature on the Brazilian political sys-
tem at the national level explains the high presiden-
tial success rate as resulting from a combination of 
presidential agenda power with a centralized orga-
nization for the parliament (Figueiredo and Limongi 
2000; Santos 2003; Amorim Neto et al. 2003). We 
hypothesize, then, that the more centralized the 
state assemblies are, the more likely it will be for the 
corresponding governors to reach a very high suc-
cess rate for their bills, comparable to Westminster-
-style parliaments. 
Finally, the third puzzle is: How can governors be-
longing to presidential and parliamentary systems 
have essentially the same success rate for their bills? 
If the constitutional rules governing the systems 
are so different, and Brazilian governors do not 
have the same constitutional mechanisms (namely 
the vote of confidence) to hold coalitions together, 
then we expect legislative organization to explain at 
least some of the similarity between Brazilian and 
German governors. 
(III) Explaining the puzzles through 
legislative mechanisms
In order to address the puzzles presented above, we 
develop an analytical framework, focusing on legis-
lative rules within the standing orders of the subna-
tional assemblies. While most literature is focused 
on the ‘basic’ institutions, laid down in the constitu-
tions and electoral laws, all three presented models 
inherently also address these ‘minor’ legislative ru-
les as well, since they can have considerable impacts 
on policymakers and outcomes. Particularly, recent 
studies on positive and negative agenda-setting 
power (Cox 2000; 2006) highlight the relevance of 
standing orders to understand the relationship be-
tween parties, governing coalitions and legislators 
within the institutional context of the assemblies in 
a comprehensive manner. 
Our analytical framework is based on theoretical 
assumptions derived from the three main models 
outlined above. It is composed of three main and 
interlinked areas. The first one addresses the com-
mittee organization, composition and competences 
and the restrictions that are attributed to the enti-
ties within the legislative process. 
The items exploring these issues are based on insi-
ghts gained from the informational model (Gilligan 
and Krehbiel 1990) and items that have already been 
applied in are often cited, as set out in the compara-
tive study of Döring (1995). The role of committees 
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in legislative organization is crucial to understand 
the institutional centralization or decentralization 
of power and the relationship between the parties, 
plenary and committees. According to the informa-
tional approach, the majority group of legislators 
rather than party coalitions controls the institutio-
nal organization and thus has the choice to centra-
lize or not to centralize power in the hands of some 
(partisan) leaders. Secondly, and more important 
in this context, legislators cannot be sure about 
the policy outcomes of the legislation. However, a 
committee system, facilitating the policy speciali-
zation of legislators (Arbeitsparlament), mitigates 
the assumed uncertainty dilemma that rational le-
gislators face. The members of committees acquire 
special knowledge and can provide other legislators 
with information and thereby yield added value to 
the whole legislature. Krehbiel (1998) argues that 
committees are not autonomous entities but rather 
are representative ones, supplying information and 
reducing uncertainty about proposed bills. In terms 
of representation, they can however represent the 
whole assembly (vis-à-vis the government) or act as 
partisan representatives. 
If committee members and committee leaders are 
chosen by party caucuses (Item 1 and 2), then power 
is more centralized in the hands of the parties and 
party leaders and the ideological representation of 
committees as entities of the whole can be under-
mined. Or as Döring (1995, 275) puts it, parties can 
indirectly control the long-range policy positions 
in the legislatures by controlling the assignment 
of committee memberships and chairs. This implies 
the assumption that more centralized committees 
can increase the legislative success of the governing 
parties, since the entities are under the influence 
of party leaders, with the offices in the committe-
es depending on them. Further, we investigate the 
competences of the committees in the legislative 
process (items 1 to 5). The power attributed to com-
mittees is supposed to have an impact on the com-
mittees’ ability to influence policy outputs and to 
shape their position and independence vis-à-vis the 
majorities in the chamber and the government. In 
this context, Krehbiel (1988) introduces the concept 
of positive and negative committee power. While the 
first enables the committee to influence change, the 
second enables the entities to preserve the status 
quo. The ability of committees to unilaterally kill 
or approve a bill (item 3 and 4) makes the entities 
more independent towards majorities on the floor 
and reflects their competence to act and to decide 
on behalf of the whole chamber through the positive 
and negative committee power attributed to them. 
Moreover, the existence or lack of a time limit for the 
debating bills before they are submitted to the floor 
constitutes another factor of the power attributed 
to committees (item 5). Without any time limit, they 
are free to block bills and the legislative process in 
order to preserve the status quo, while a time limit 
forces them to vote on the bills and deprives them of 
a way to exert negative committee power. Based on 
this, it is assumed that weaker positive and negative 
committee powers reduce the independence of com-
mittees as representatives of the whole house and 
favors the success of governing parties and party le-
aders in legislation. Finally, the last item in this sec-
tion focuses on the ability of the plenary to amend 
bills that have been already approved in committee. 
This reduces the positive and negative committee 
power and their independence in decision-making. 
It makes committee members more sensitive to ma-
jorities on the floor, whether they are unstable as 
predicted by the informational and distributive mo-
del, or stable due to partisan alignment of legisla-
tors in their voting behavior, as is assumed by the 
two other models.
With respect to the second aspect, we first investigate 
the role of leaders, steering committees and speakers 
and the indication of institutional centralization the 
standing orders provide in this context. The theo-
retical model that guides our analytical framework 
in this matter is the ‘Procedural Cartel Theory’ (Cox 
2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005), which shifts the 
focus from committees – presumed to act as agents 
of parties rather than as representatives of the who-
le house– to political parties. Since the cartel of the 
governmental majority is based on the use of the 
procedural rule-making power of the chamber, we 
address the agenda-setting power of the assumedly 
powerful legislative agenda setting offices defined 
by Cox (2006, 145) - speaker, party leaders, steering 
committee -, their centralization and the degree to 
which the parties can control them.
The question arises as to whether party leaders have 
agenda-setting prerogatives that enable them to 
place bills on the agenda, or to prevent bills –e.g., 
of the minority– from reaching the floor. While the 
‘Procedural Cartel Theory’ assumes that positive 
and negative agenda-setting power for the majori-
ty is always present, its concrete nature varies and 
implies different legislative results and success ra-
tes. In order to reveal the agenda-setting power, 
we investigate to how many office institutions the 
powers and privileges are attributed (item 6). The 
more the majority parties can control the agenda 
through fewer institutions in a coherent manner, 
the more the model predicts legislative success and/
or the avoidance of negative legislative results for 
the parties forming the majority. Due to the crucial 
importance of this item for the agenda setting and 
consequently for the legislative process, we have 
decided to weight it double. 
However, Cox and McCubbins (2005) acknowledge 
that the degree to which party members and leaders 
agree on the party’s collective reputation influences 
the correlation of the agenda-setting powers and le-
gislative outcomes. The related mechanism in item 9 
highlights the existence or absence of the negati-
ve agenda-setting power of the committees to hold 
bills back from the floor votes, as is often observed 
in the case of the United States Congress. This is 
linked to the urgency regime, which centralizes po-
wer in the hands of party leaders and weakens com-
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mittee powers, since it enables leaders to take bills 
out of committee and to put them to a floor vote 
immediately. Such urgency regimes exist, for exam-
ple, in Brazil and Chile (Amorim Neto et al. 2003, 
pp. 258-259) and can help explain legislative suc-
cess by the positive agenda-setting power of party 
leaders. However, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship between the negative agenda-setting 
power of committees and the positive-agenda-set-
ting power of party leaders and the full legislature 
in detail in order to decide on the degree of centra-
lization in this matter.
In a last aspect, we focus on the floor procedure 
and more particularly on one item, derived from 
the ‘Conditional Party Government-Model’ (Rhode 
1991): the floor procedure to split proposed bills 
and to only vote on specific parts of them (‘desta-
que para votação em separado’ in Portuguese). The 
model predicts partisan aligned voting behavior to 
be the result of distributive intra-party negotia-
tions and offered incentives, often in the form of 
‘omnibus bills’. Thereby, the party leaders are able 
to broker deals among legislators, enabling them 
to overcome intra-party opposition by offering su-
fficient ‘carrots’ and/or ‘sticks’ in return. The pro-
cedure to vote separately on specific parts of a bill 
can expose these deals and equilibriums inherent 
in the bill and therefore decreases the agenda-
-setting power of governing party leaders vis-à-vis 
single legislators. At the same time, its exposes 
composed legislation is a sharp instrument in the 
hands of the opposition. This is particularly true 
if one thinks of coalition governments with little 
ideological homogeneity. Thus, it is important to 
analyze the requirements, laid down in the stan-
ding orders, to request and achieve this voting 
procedure on the floor, which is an indicator of 
decentralization of the legislative process and po-
tentially decreases the legislative success of gover-
ning parties.
We believe that the mechanism explained here can 
contribute to answer our guiding questions: How 
can we explain the exceptionally high success ra-
tes in some of Brazilian and all of German states, 
reaching the levels of those of Westminster-style 
systems? What are the explanations accounting for 
the variance of the success rates in the Brazilian and 
German cases at the subnational level and between 
the subnational and the federal level?
(IV) Results
The German cases
Our analysis shows that the basic legislative insti-
tutions in the German Länder hardly vary in the sec-
tions on the agenda-setting power and on the floor 
voting procedures and that they are centralized in 
both aspects to a high degree. The agenda setting is 
usually dominated by party leaders within the stee-
ring committees, as is the case at the federal level 
(Chandler et al. 2003). The Councils of Elders, the 
committees that control the legislative agenda set-
ting and procedures, are proportionally composed 
of party leaders in all the German cases. So the abi-
lity to control the agenda is given and can be used, 
as it is the case in the Bundestag.
As Chandler et al. (2011, 28) points out, govern-
mental parties control the agenda in Germany due 
to three reasons: i) they hold the majority of se-
ats in committees and the Council of Elders; ii) the 
Council of Elders allows the majority to control the 
substantive content of bills, while the rights of the 
opposition to criticize proposals are guaranteed on 
the basis of consensus; and iii) once established, 
the agenda of the Council of Elders can only be 
contested by majority vote on the floor. Thus the 
governing coalition partners can implement any 
agreement they reach among themselves on what 
will and will not appear on the agenda. While party 
leaders thereby hold positive and negative agen-
da-setting power, the speaker, as the head of the 
assembly, is reduced to a formal, rather marginal 
function and follows the decisions of the German 
steering committees on the agenda and voting 
procedures. But contrary to the Brazilian case, 
the governmental agenda setters do not have the 
urgency-regime mechanism in order to take bills 
out of committee and to influence and hasten the 
legislative process further. However, this does not 
imply negative agenda-setting power of commit-
tees vis-à-vis parties, since the party caucuses are 
able to demand submission to the floor in almost 
all German Länder (except Bavaria).
As far as the voting procedures on the floor are con-
cerned, the splitting of bills is usually possible, if is 
demanded by a low threshold of legislators on the 
floor (usually 5 percent), and if it is supported by a 
simple majority. While this – according to the ‘Con-
ditional Party Government-Model’– can decrease the 
agenda control of the governing coalitions, since it 
exposes coalition trade-offs and the bill’s potentially 
unpopular parts to separate voting, the requirement 
of the simple majority enables the governing party 
coalition to avoid this procedure. For heterogeneous 
coalitions, the mechanism can still constitute a se-
rious threat and reduce its legislative success.
The most variation with regard to the degree of 
centralization of basic legislative organization ins-
titutions exists in the mechanisms concerning com-
mittee organization, composition and competences 
and restrictions attributed to entities within the 
legislative process. While in the standing orders 
of four states (Bavaria, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Sa-
chsen, Thüringen), all tested mechanisms indicate 
centralization in the hands of the parties, signi-
ficantly more committee powers are attributed to 
the legislative entities in Baden-Wuertemberg and 
Hamburg (committees can unilaterally kill and ap-
prove bills and/or have no time limits to analyze 
them). However, we find no clear indication of an 
association between this variance and the legislati-
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ve success rates, since very centralized states such 
as Thüringen and Sachsen feature some of the lo-
west success rates during specific legislative perio-
ds, while Hamburg as a less centralized Land scores 
consistently high.4 
Overall, the success rates in the German cases are 
surprisingly high and the variance rather low. The 
average success rate of the 45 legislatures that we 
have investigated is above 97 percent and there-
fore much higher than the two baselines of Saiegh 
(2009) (83 percent) and the empirical data regar-
ding the federal level (around 85 percent) suggest 
(Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011b). As a matter of fact, all 
success rates during the investigated period cons-
tantly lie above 93 percent and reach in eleven cases 
the top score of 100 percent. The only exception is 
the lower success rate of the government in Saar-
land during one legislative period (87 percent).
Compared to the federal Bundestag, the degree of 
centralization at the subnational level is very similar 
to most Länder. The agenda setting and floor voting 
procedure patterns in the states mirror the federal 
level perfectly. In terms of organization, composi-
tion, competences and restrictions, the committees 
of the Bundestag resemble those in Brandenburg, 
Berlin, Bremen, Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Hols-
tein, since the entities cannot kill or approve bills 
unilaterally and have no time limit to debate bills.
Explaining the results in  
the German cases
As far as the comparison to the basic institutions at 
the federal level are concerned, neither the electoral 
systems nor the coalition composition can account 
for the difference in the success rates on the subna-
tional and federal level. The mixed election systems 
of most Länder resemble the federal one, consisting 
of personalized proportional representation systems 
(Eder and Magin 2008; Masicotte 2010). Moreover, 
neither the partisan composition nor the number of 
governing coalition parties alone can serve as expla-
nation for the difference in the success rates betwe-
en both levels. The governing coalitions in the Länder 
are often equal to the ones at the federal level and 
most of the existing party systems are similar (see 
Mielke and Reutter 2004; Schniewind 2008). Inste-
ad, the most appropriate explanation for the signi-
ficantly higher success rates of governing coalitions 
in the Länder lies in the fact that most bills not only 
need to be approved by the Bundestag, but also by 
the Bundesrat, which is the federal representation 
of the Länder. It extends party politics by the federal 
conflict dimension between the Bund and the Länder 
and the leads to the possibility of a divided govern-
ment (Rudzio 2003, Patzelt 2004). This complicates 
the legislative process and explains why the success 
rates of centralized legislatures at both levels are so 
different under similar conditions (election system, 
composition of coalitions and party systems).
With regard to the variance in the legislative suc-
cess rates of governments and governmental coali-
tions in the Länder from 1990-2010, we have already 
pointed to the fact that according to our data, the 
degree of centralization cannot provide a sufficient 
explanation, nor do election systems. The dominant 
literature still focuses on government coalitions 
and ideological conflict to explain success rates in 
parliamentary systems (Cheibub et al. 2004; Saiegh 
2009, Bräuniger and Debus 2009). Arguably, single 
party governments should obtain higher legislative 
success rates, while multiparty government coali-
tions comprise more players in the form of gover-
nmental leaders with veto powers, especially when 
heterogeneity in the coalition is high (Saiegh 2009, 
p. 1350). For the German cases, we can rely on the 
spectrum of polarization of party governments ac-
cording to a classic right-left scheme in order to 
check this finding for the Länder (Schniewind 2008).
We find that in 12 out of 15 cases of a single-party 
government, the success rate is above the average 
of 97 percent. Besides this, the multiparty coalitions 
in the Länder have in common only two parties, with 
one exception of a three-party governing coalition 
in Hamburg (from 2001-2004, with a success rate of 
97 percent). However, in this group we find no in-
dication of a considerable impact of polarization of 
coalition partners on the success rates. More polari-
zed coalition compositions, such as the combination 
SPD/FDP or CDU/Grüne, do not score significantly 
lower as the literature on coalitions and legislative 
success suggests should be the case.  
Altogether, our analysis does not prove the hypo-
thesis that a higher degree of centralization of the 
basic legislative  rules leads to higher legislative 
success of the governments in the case of the Län-
der. Instead, we can explain the higher legislative 
success at the subnational level by the absence of an 
institution like the Bundesrat. The only indication 
we find with regard to the puzzle of the variation be-
tween the states and different legislative periods is 
the distinction between single-party governments 
and two-party governments, since single-party go-
vernments score higher.
The Brazilian cases and preliminary 
explanations for the results
The 27 Brazilian state assemblies average 7.48 out 
of 10 on our legislative centralization index. Their 
committee systems – with the exception of Paraí-
ba, Rio Grande do Norte and Rio Grande do Sul – 
are somewhat toothless. A typical example is Mato 
Grosso do Sul, where committee members are cho-
sen by party caucuses according to proportionality; 
committee chairs are elected by committee mem-
bers; committees are powerless both to unilaterally 
approve and kill bills, and there is a time limit to 
analyze bills before they go to the floor. This ins-
titutional design is compounded by the fact that 
all governors may attach the “urgency regime” to 
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most of their bills, making the committee system 
even more irrelevant. Our expectation is that the 
less powerful the committee system is, the easier 
(and quicker) it is for a governor to pass bills throu-
gh the legislature. 
There is more interesting variation regarding agenda-
-setting institutions in the assemblies. In 18 states, 
only one institution or person (usually the speaker) 
concentrates both positive and negative agenda po-
wer. We expect these assemblies to be associated with 
higher legislative success rates for the governor, sin-
ce he or she would have to deal with less veto players 
than is usual in Brazil’s political system.  
Regarding the three items related to the plenary, 
there is no variation in the 27 Brazilian states. In all 
assemblies, the full legislature can amend bills pas-
sed by committees (though the threshold for this 
varies somewhat); the plenary can divide bills and 
vote on specific parts of them and the “urgency re-
gime” procedure – which allows the plenary to vote 
on bills that were examined in committee – exists. 
Our empirical basis is the dataset assembled by Ric-
ci and Tomio (2010), in which they assess the legis-
lative success rate of 17 Brazilian governors from 
1994 to 2008. There are 61 observations. In about 
half (34/61) there are very centralized assemblies 
(ranking 8 or higher in our centralization index). In 
32 of 61 observations of Brazilian state assemblies, 
governors have a success rate higher than 90 per-
cent, which is very Westminster-like. Nineteen of the 
observations occur in very centralized assemblies and 
13 in somewhat centralized assemblies. This is in line 
with earlier works on the state assemblies in Brazil, 
most notably Abrucio (1998), although he does not 
focus on legislative organization as an explanatory 
variable for governors’ success. 
In the São Paulo state assembly (Alesp), like in 
many others, governors can resort to negotiations 
with the speaker, who is empowered to appoint a 
“Special Rapporteur” (Relator Especial) to substitu-
te committee reports. This mechanism is frequently 
used to fast-track government bills.5  Therefore, one 
must not ignore the importance of minor legislative 
institutions in the agenda setting and success rate 
of Brazilian governors. 
Table 1 shows how the state assemblies fare accor-
ding to the Saiegh (2009) baseline for executive 
success in presidential multiparty systems (Brazil) 
and parliamentary multiparty systems (Germany) 
and also the federal level baseline for executive 
success in both countries.
Table 3. Governors’ success rate in Brazilian States (1994-2008) and German States (1990-2010)
Higher success 
than Saiegh (2009) 
baseline?
Higher success  
than federal  
level baseline?
More than  
90% success?
Very centralized assemblies 96% (70/73) 93% (68/73) 78% (57/73)
Somewhat centralized 
assemblies 97% (30/31) 90% (28/31) 55% (17/31)
Total 96% (100/104) 92% (96/104) 71% (74/104)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Ricci and Tomio (2010), Saiegh (2009) and Brazilian state assemblies’ standing orders. 
Some tentative conclusions based on Table 3 are 
in order: 
I) Governors’ success rates in both Brazil and Ger-
many seem not to be associated with centralization 
of legislative institutions. This means that coalition 
management and party politics may play a bigger 
role than expected by some of the literature. 
II) Minor legislative institutions – such as the ap-
pointment of Special Rapporteurs in some Brazi-
lian cases – can compound the governors’ strength 
and allow them to reach Westminster levels of le-
gislative success.
III) Legislative mechanisms associated with the 
workings of the full legislature may be important in 
defining the content of legislation (Heller 2001) and 
some policy outcomes (Rasch 2000), but they do not 
seem relevant for the success rate of the executive. 
IV) The analysis of the agenda-setting power should 
be extended by further research on coalitions and 
their policy agreements. The number of coalition 
partners and the degree of ideological homogeneity 
or heterogeneity might influence legislative suc-
cess, as a large part of the literature already notes. 
V) The policy content of bills influences the probabi-
lity of executive success (Gamm and Kousser 2010) 
and therefore should be taken into consideration. 
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Notas
1  Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011b) is a recent exception.
2  The empirical finding of regular legislative voting-behavior along party lines does not represent a refutation 
of the model, since the observations might simply capture aggregate preferences that correlate with partisan 
membership. Taking this perspective, they do not provide convincing evidence for ‘party influence’.
3  With the exception of four states.
4  Unfortunately, the data for three German states are not publicly available or were not provided as we reques-
ted from the assembly research services (Baden-Wuertemberg, Berlin and Bremen).
5  Interviews with São Paulo deputies and Alesp staff carried out by us and research assistant Thiago Belmar 
in the first half of 2011 support this.
